Central Bank Haircut Policy by James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, and Miguel Molico
 
Working Paper/Document de travail 
2010-23 
Central Bank Haircut Policy 
by James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, and Miguel Molico 
 
   2
Bank of Canada Working Paper 2010-23 
October 2010 




2 and Miguel Molico
2 
  1Financial Stability Department 
2Funds Management and Banking Department 
Bank of Canada 




Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in 
economics and finance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. 
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. 
 
ISSN 1701-9397  © 2010 Bank of Canada  
   ii
Acknowledgements 
We have benefited from the comments and suggestions of Mitchell Berlin, Lindsay 
Cheung, Alejandro Garcia, Charles Kahn, Cyril Monnet, Enchuan Shao and Brett 
Stuckey as well as participants in seminars at the Bank of Canada, Bank of England and 
The Workshop on Central Bank Liquidity Tools at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, The Far Eastern 2009 Summer Meetings of Econometric Society and The 2009 
Workshop on Money and Payments at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.   iii
Abstract 
We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of 
the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of 
insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of 
the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between 
relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation 
risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal 
haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who 
actually need liquidity. Finally, for an unexpected drop in the haircut, the central bank 
can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut. 
JEL classification: E40, E50 
Bank classification: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems; Central bank research; 
Monetary policy implementation; Financial system regulation and policies; Financial 
services 
Résumé 
Les auteurs étudient la politique de décote optimale à l’aide d’un modèle formalisant 
l’octroi par la banque centrale de prêts contre garantie. Ils montrent qu’une facilité de 
prêt offre une assurance à la fois contre le risque de liquidité et contre le risque de baisse 
de la valeur de la garantie. L’établissement du niveau de la décote suppose donc un 
arbitrage entre, d’une part, le desserrement des contraintes de liquidité des agents et, 
d’autre part, le risque de faire augmenter l’inflation et de fausser les choix de portefeuille 
des agents. Les auteurs soutiennent que la décote optimale est plus élevée lorsque la 
banque centrale n’est pas en mesure de limiter exclusivement ses prêts aux agents qui ont 
réellement besoin de liquidités. Enfin, quand elle abaisse la décote de façon inattendue, la 
banque centrale a plus de latitude que lorsqu’elle en fixe durablement le niveau. 
Classification JEL : E40, E50 
Classification de la Banque : Systèmes de paiement, de compensation et de règlement; 
Recherches menées par les banques centrales; Mise en œuvre de la politique monétaire; 
Réglementation et politiques relatives au système financier; Services financiers 
 
 1 Introduction
In this paper we examine how a central bank should make loans of a liquid asset
(in this case central bank reserve money) that are collateralized by illiquid and
risky assets. This is an important question since in an economy with trading
frictions and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, two empirically relevant features,
the equilibrium allocation is typically ineﬃcient due to some agents being liq-
uidity constrained due to their ex-post excessive holding of illiquid assets. With
trading frictions (and hence illiquid assets) this ineﬃciency leads to a role for
a central bank in creating and distributing liquidity. In such an economy, a
benevolent central bank may desire to provide liquidity to constrained agents
by using a lending facility. When there is a lack of perfect enforcement of these
loans, illiquid assets can be taken as collateral for loans. However, the value
of this collateral can change over time and it is therefore necessary to require
a pledge of collateral large enough to adequately cover losses in the event of
a default (i.e. by setting a positive haircut).1 This facility is similar to that
studied by Berentsen and Monnet (2008) with the exception that we relax their
assumption of perfect enforcement.
When a lender seeks to make a collateralized loan to a borrower, the value of
the collateral is usually subject to a discount or “haircut” to ensure that in the
event of a default the collateral can be liquidated to repay a suﬃcient amount
of the loan; since the price of the collateralized asset may have declined in the
intervening period. The typical way these haircuts are calculated in the private
sector (which we term a risk-management approach) is via an examination
of the historical volatility of the value of the collateral and setting a haircut
to limit the risk exposure of the lender.2 This risk-management approach is
an appropriate methodology for a market participant who has little market
1In addition, the haircut has to be suﬃcient to induce the lender to repay the loan and
not default if strategic default is allowed as shown by Lacker (2001).
2See, for example, Garcia and Gen¸ cay (2006, section 6.2) and related risk management
literature referenced therein.
2power and aims at maximizing its own proﬁt. We argue in this paper that the
typical risk-management approach to setting the haircuts is not appropriate for
a central bank. We base this conclusion on the fact that a central bank is a large
market participant in the interbank market as well as other funding markets; it
is benevolent in that it cares about the eﬃciency and stability of the ﬁnancial
system instead of its own proﬁts; and ﬁnally it has the unique ability to create
liquid assets in the form of central bank liabilities. Therefore, a central bank,
when it sets haircuts, must take into account the eﬀect its operations will have
on the incentives and decisions of other ﬁnancial market participants.
We use a model that captures the main features of such a lending facility
to study the general equilibrium eﬀects of the haircut on the consumption and
portfolio decisions of agents, equilibrium asset prices, aggregate welfare, and
also the default decision of central bank borrows.3 We ﬁnd two key elements
in determining the optimal level of the haircut.
First, there is a trade-oﬀ between liquidity and default risk. A lending
facility provides a bundle of two insurances: insurance against liquidity risk
and also an insurance against the downside risk of illiquid asset.4 Lowering a
haircut relaxes the liquidity constraint of the illiquid portfolio holders (which
can be welfare improving if the constraint is binding). On the other hand, it
also provides the borrowers an option to shift the investment loss to the central
bank when the value of the asset turns out to be low (which is not welfare
improving). As a result, decreasing the haircut will make the illiquid, risky
asset more attractive and may distort agents’ portfolio choices, inducing an
agent with high need for liquidity to hold a portfolio which is illiquid and risky.
Second, lowering the haircut will increase the exposure of the central bank
3We take as given the features of the standing lending facility (i.e. collateralized loans
subject to a haircut) and focus on the determination of the optimal haircut policy. These
features are meant to capture properties of existing lending facilities (e.g., the broad insti-
tutional framework of the Canadian Large Value Payment System (LVTS)). Designing an
optimal setup of the lending facility is not the goal of the paper.
4A reader may think of downside risk as market risk. We use the term downside risk to
highlight the moral hazard aspects of providing this insurance.
3to losses and hence potentially increases in expected inﬂation. When lump-sum
taxation is not an instrument available to the central bank, liquidity loaned out
for payment may not be fully re-absorbed if the borrowers default. This will
increase potential inﬂation which in turn increases the equilibrium opportunity
costs of holding liquid assets, and therefore tightens the liquidity constraints of
holders of the liquid asset.
We also point out that one key factor is whether the central bank is able to
lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity.5 When exclusive lending
is not feasible, the cost of providing liquidity insurance to the illiquid asset
holders by lowering the haircut becomes more costly in terms of distorting the
liquid asset holders’ liquidity constraint. Owing to this trade-oﬀ, it is generally
not optimal to set the haircut too low. Finally, we also illustrate that, if the
central bank can commit not to repeat in the future, a temporary, surprise cut
in the haircut can be welfare improving.
Our model is related to the recent literature that deals with how the central
bank’s operating procedures can aﬀect the allocation of the economy. Specif-
ically our paper is closely related to the papers by Berentsen and Monnet
(2008) and Martin and Monnet (2008). Examples of related work in this area
are Chapman and Martin (2007), Khan (2008) and Su´ arez-Lled´ o (2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
environment. Section 3 derives and characterizes the equilibrium and discusses
the policy constraint faced by the central bank. Section 4 focuses on a special
type of equilibria where agents specialize in their asset portfolio choices and
derives some analytical and numerical result. Section 5 considers more general
cases and discusses optimal haircut policy. Section 6 provides some discussion
on endogeneizing the amount of pledgeable assets. Finally, we provide some
concluding remarks in section 7.
5The recent literature has made a distinction between funding and market liquidity. In
this paper, the liquidity of our model can be thought of as market liquidity.
42 Model
Before going into the formal setup and analysis, we will ﬁrst provide an overview
of the model and discuss how it maps to the real world, in particular, how it
captures key features of existing payment systems, like the Canadian Large
Value Transfer System (LVTS).
2.1 Overview
The model builds on four key features of payment systems to motivate the
role of the haircut policy. First, payment system participants face a non-trivial
portfolio choice between holding liquid and illiquid assets. Liquid assets are
needed to send payments in the payment systems. Illiquid assets yield a higher
return and are generally riskier. Second, participants face uncertainty regarding
their liquidity needs, modeled here as idiosyncratic liquidity shocks realized
after agents make their portfolio choice. Some participants may end up holding
too much illiquid assets when they are facing a high liquidity need. In the
absence of intraday interbank money market, there is a role for a central bank
lending facility.6 Third, these loans are subject to potential default by the
borrowers. This motivates the need to require borrowers to pledge collateral.
Fourth, the asset price of the collateral is uncertain. This generates the need
to impose a haircut on the collateral.
Our model is based on the alternating market formulation of Lagos and
Wright (2005), and liquidity shocks of Berentsen and Monnet (2008). This
allows us to study frictions in the interbank market but still have frictionless
trade in the asset market. We will use this model to study how changing the
haircut policy will induce the endogenous response of default and portfolio
choice.7
6Martin and McAndrews (2008) discuss the lack of an intraday market for reserves and
present arguments for and against such a market.
7The Lagos-Wright framework can allow us to analyze the question in a relatively tractable
fashion, by eliminating the wealth eﬀects of idiosyncratic trading histories. Moreover, as
52.2 Environment
Time is discrete and denoted t = 0,1,2,.... In this economy, there is a measure
one continuum of anonymous, inﬁnitely lived agents. As in Berentsen and
Monnet (2008), one can interpret each of these agents as a consolidated unit
consisting of a bank and its clients.8
Each period is divided into three consecutive subperiods. In the ﬁrst sub-
period, an asset market (denoted by AM) is open where agents (banks) make
portfolio choice between liquid and illiquid assets. The asset market remains
open during the following subperiods. In the second subperiod, a decentralized
market (denoted by DM) opens where agents trade goods against the liquid
assets. We interpret this market as banks sending payments to each other in
the payment system to settle the goods transactions among their underlying
clients. The DM and the AM are segmented, in the sense that DM participants
do not have access to the AM during the second subperiod.9 With probability
1   α the agent participates in the DM market, with probability α and agents
remains in the asset market.10 In the DM the central bank provides intraday
collateralized loans to agents subject to a haircut.11 In the third subperiod,
agents enter a centralized market (denoted CM) to trade a numeraire good and
to settle their intraday loans with the central bank. The basic setup of these
markets is described in ﬁgure 1.
argued in Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2008), the Lagos-Wright setup well captures the
feature of periodic settlement in a payment systems.
8We think that modeling the bank-client relationship explicitly is interesting, but may not
be of ﬁrst order importance for the main question of the paper. We will leave this extension
for future research.
9This assumption is meant to capture the absence of an intraday interbank market and
provides a role for central bank liquidity provision.
10In the second subperiod, we only need some trade in the asset market to pin down the
price of the asset. For this purpose,  has to be non-zero, but can be arbitrarily small.
11While we model the role of collateralized intra-day loans to buyers, we abstract from
the possibility of sellers earning interest on their idle balances. Potentially, one can incorpo-
rate this feature by introducing an intra-day interbank market, or having the central bank
operating a paying interest on reserve deposit. This tends to increase the value of holding
money balances and reduces the distortion of inﬂation, as already pointed out by the existing
































Figure 1: Timeline of Markets and Actions in a Given Period t
We are going to consider a stationary environment. The per-period utility







2 2 R+ denotes the consumption of the DM goods when the agent is a
buyer, and qs
2 2 R+ denotes the production of the DM goods when the agent is
a seller in the second subperiod. u : R+ ! R denotes the utility of consuming
q units of the DM goods. H3 2 R denotes the production (net of consumption)
of the CM goods. We assume that u(.) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing, strictly concave, satisﬁes u(0) = 0, u′(0) = 1, u′(1) = 0,
u′(q∗) = 1 for some q∗ > 0.
To introduce an interesting portfolio choice into the model, we assume that
there are two assets: a liquid asset and an illiquid asset. The liquid asset
is the only asset that is acceptable as a means of payment in the DM. It is
denoted by mt and can be interpreted as ﬁat money or bank reserves. Money
is perfectly divisible, costlessly storable, and cannot be produced or consumed
by any private agent. The supply of the stock of this asset is controlled by
the central bank. The central bank injects money by non-negative lump-sum
transfers. An important assumption is that the central bank is not able to make
negative money transfers (i.e. lump-sum taxation). Money pays no dividend.
The illiquid asset is denoted by at. It is illiquid because it cannot be used
as a means of payment in the DM. One can interpret it as claims to invest-
7ment projects held by the agents. For simplicity, we assume that each agent is
endowed with A one-period projects at the beginning of a period. Each unit
of asset yields real dividend δt (in terms of CM numeraire goods) at the end
of the period t CM. To introduce the feature of asset price uncertainty, we as-
sume that δ is a random i.i.d. (owner speciﬁc) variable, drawn from a uniform
distribution over the support [¯ δ(1   ε), ¯ δ(1 + ε)], and with mean ¯ δ < 1. The
prices of these projects are denoted by ψ: ψ1 is the nominal price of the asset
in the subperiod 1 AM; ψ2 is the nominal value of the dividend of the asset
in the subperiod 2 AM; and ψ3 is the price in the subperiod 3 CM after the
realization of δ (before the dividend is paid).
Sequence of Events
Figure 2 shows the timeline of the model. At the beginning of each period,
each agent receives a noisy signal which suggests whether an agent is likely to
be a payment sender (buyer) in the DM (i.e. high liquidity need), or likely to
be a payment recipient (seller) in the DM (i.e. low liquidity need). Given the
signal, agents trade in the AM and make portfolio choices of liquid asset m and
illiquid asset a. Typically, an agent expecting a high liquidity need will choose
to hold more liquid asset, and one expecting a low liquidity need will choose a
more illiquid portfolio.
To introduce idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, we assume that the signal will
turn out to be incorrect with a positive probability θ. In particular, after the
portfolio choice is made, an agent enters the DM with probability 1   α and
observes the realization of his/her trading status: buyer (i.e. payment sender)
or a seller (i.e. payment recipient). In a bilateral meeting, the buyer makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (q,p) to the seller, where q denotes the quantity of goods
and p denotes the quantity of money to be traded. Since trading in the DM is
subject to a liquidity constraint (only m is acceptable as means of payment),























Figure 2: Sequence of Events during a period t
purchase goods. Their liquidity constraints can be relaxed by borrowing from
the central bank’s intraday lending facility by posting the asset as collateral.
Before trade, buyers (but not sellers or asset traders) have access to central
bank standing facilities. The intraday interest rate is zero.12 The borrowing
constraint in nominal terms is set by the central bank:
l2  a2ψ2(1   h),
where h denotes the haircut imposed on the collateral. This loan has to be
settled in the CM in the third subperiod. To introduce the role of strategic
default, we assume that at the beginning of the CM, the values of all projects
become public information, and after that borrowers decide whether to settle
12The zero interest assumption is motivated by the fact that the intra-day interest rate in
most payment systems are zero or very close to zero. For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2009)
reported that “In most countries, the cost of reserves intraday is very close to zero. Many
central banks, including the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England, or the
Swiss National Bank allow collateralized intraday borrowing at no cost. In the U.S., banks
are allowed to incur uncollateralized daylight overdrafts for which they incur a small fee.”






































Figure 3: Flows of Agents
the loan (and get back the asset) or to default (and lose the asset).13 In the
absence of additional punishment device, a borrower who has pledged asset a
and borrowed l will default if the realization of the asset value is low, l  aψ3.14
Figure 3 illustrates the ﬂow of agents across states.
3 Equilibrium
We are going to solve the model backwards: ﬁrst solving for the CM problem
in subperiod 3, then the DM and AM problems in subperiod 2, and ﬁnally the
AM problem in subperiod 1.
13Although in the presence of asset price uncertainty the assumption of strategic default
seems natural, it is not essential for most of our results.
14In general, one can assume that default also involves a cost of R (e.g. punishment,
reputation cost). As a result, an agent will default only if l  a 3 + R. When R is a
ﬁnite number, agents may still strategically default. When R = +1, agents have perfect
commitment. When R is drawn randomly from the set f 1;+1g, then it is exogenous
default. Furthermore, agents are assumed to be anonymous, so the central bank or other
agents cannot induce repayment by future punishment (e.g. forever autarky). One may relax
this assumption and endogenize the value of R.
10Subperiod 3: Centralized Market
In the CM, agents observe the payoﬀs of the assets (δt) and then choose whether
to default and money holding (m+1) for the following AM. We use the subscript
+1 to denote values during the next period. The price of money in terms of
CM goods is ϕ3. We use y3 to denote the real value of wealth an agent brings
to the CM (which is the real value of the money and assets in his portfolio
after the default decision, and will be derived below). After deciding whether
to default, an agents’ optimization problem is to choose production H3, and





 H3 = y3   ϕ3m+1 + ϕ3∆M.
Here, ∆M = M+1   M3 with M3 and M+1 being the total money stock at the
beginning and at the end of subperiod 3 respectively. Z+1 is the value function
for next period’s AM market. The linearity of utility implies that
W(y3) = max
m+1
y3   ϕ3m+1 + ϕ3∆M + βZ+1(m+1)
F.O.C.:
m+1 : ϕ3  β
∂
∂m+1
Z+1(m+1),= if m+1 > 0
Note that the choice of m+1 is independent of y3. We will focus on symmetric
equilibrium with m+1 = M+1 for all agents, so that the distribution of money





W(y3) = W(0) + y3
In principle, agents can also trade their assets in the CM, but they do not have
incentive to do so because of the linear utility. In particular, the no-arbitrage
condition implies that an asset which is going to deliver δ units of goods at
the end of the period has a nominal price ψ3(δ) = δ/ϕ3. The following lemma
summarizes the result.
Lemma 1. The CM problem implies
(i) W(y) is linear in y, with W ′(y) = 1;
(ii) All agents choose the same m+1 = M+1;
(iii) ψ3(δ) = δ/ϕ3.
Subperiod 2: Asset Market and Decentralized Market
In subperiod 2, agents start with money holding m2 and asset holding a2. There
is a shock that determines an agent’s trading status. With a probability α, an
agent enters the AM as an asset trader. With a probability 1   α, an agent
enters the DM as a goods trader.





W(y3) = ϕ3m3 + ϕ3E(ψ3)a3 + W(0)
subject to
m2 + ψ2a2 = m3 + ψ2a3
F.O.C.s:
m3 : λ2  1,= if m3 > 0
a3 : λ2ψ2  E(ψ3),= if a3 > 0
12where λ2 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier. Market clearing conditions imply
ψ2 = E(ψ3). Note that the choices (m3,a3) are independent of (m2,a2).
V
AM
m (m2,a2) = ϕ3
V
AM
a (m2,a2) = ϕ3E(ψ3)
Therefore,
V
AM(m2,a2) = ϕ3m2 + ϕ3E(ψ3)a2 + W(0)
Trading in AM does not aﬀect the payoﬀ of agents. The following lemma
summarizes the result.
Lemma 2. The AM problem implies
(i) V AM
m (m2,a2) = ϕ3;
(ii) V AM
a (m2,a2) = ϕ3E(ψ3);
(iii) ψ2 = E(ψ3).
Before we consider the DM problem, let’s ﬁrst determine the continuation
value in the following CM. At the beginning of the next centralized market,
borrowers (i.e. buyers in the DM) observe δ and ψ3(δ) = δ/ϕ3 and choose
whether to pay back l2 or to give up the collateral and default. Note that the
real wealth at the beginning of the following centralized market is







That is, the real wealth is equal to the real value of the unspent money holding
(ϕ3(m2  (p  l2))), plus real value of the unpledged asset (ϕ3ψ3[a2  
l2
ψ2(1−h)]),
plus the potential gain from repaying the loan (ϕ3ψ3
l2
ψ2(1−h)   ϕ3l2). Note that
the agent always has an option to default, in particular it happens when the
asset value drops too much (i.e.
ψ3
ψ2 too low) relative to the haircut (i.e. 1
1−h
13too low). Simplifying the above expression, we get




If the central bank wants to ensure repayment in any circumstances, the fol-









Therefore, the no-default constraint is particularly binding when ψ3 (i.e. δ)
is low. When δ = ¯ δ in all realization (i.e. ε = 0), h can be set to zero (no
haircut). When ψ3 = 0 in some realization (i.e. ε = 1), h has to be one (i.e. the
asset is not an eligible collateral) to guarantee no-default in all circumstances.
In general, if the central bank sets an haircut such that













ϕ3m2   ϕ3p + ϕ3ψ3a2 + l2 maxfϕ3  
ϕ3ψ3
ψ2(1−h),0g
ϕ3m2 + ϕ3p + ϕ3ψ3a2
, for a buyer
, for a seller
Therefore, the payoﬀ of a buyer in the DM is
u(q) + EW(y)
= u(q) + EW(0) + E(y)




= u(q) + constant + ϕ3m2   ϕ3p + ϕ3a2E(ψ3) + ϕ3l2S(h),
14where S(h) is the option value of default, derived in the following lemma (see
appendix A).
Lemma 3. The expected value of the option to default is equal to S(h) =
(ε−h)2
4ε(1−h).
Note that, S  0 and S is positive whenever h < ε (i.e. partial haircut).
Now, we look at the maximization problem faced by a buyer in the decentralized
market when the standing facility is available:
max
q,p u(q) + (ϕ3m2   ϕ3p + ϕ3a2E(ψ3) + ϕ3l2S(h))
subject to
Liquidity constraint : m2 + l2  p
Borrowing constraint : l2  ψ2a2(1   h)
Seller’s participation constraint : ϕ3p = q
Here, assuming buyers have all the bargaining power, the buyer needs to choose
the terms of trade (q,p) to maximize the payoﬀ, subject to the liquidity con-
straint, the borrowing constraint, and the seller’s participation constraint. This
problem is equivalent to solving
max
q,l2
u(q)   q + ϕ3l2S(h)
subject to
m2 + l2  q/ϕ3
ψ2a2(1   h)  l2
Using ηm and ηa to denote the multipliers of the two constraints, then the FOCs
15are given by
q : ϕ3(u
′(q)   1) = ηm
l2 : ϕ3S(h) + ηm = ηa
From now on, we will focus on monetary equilibria with ϕ3 > 0. The ﬁrst con-
dition implies that whenever u′(q) > 1, the liquidity constraint is binding. The
second condition implies that whenever S(h) > 0 or u′(q) > 1, the borrowing
constraint is binding:
Lemma 4. If h < ε, then l2 = ψ2a2(1   h).
That is, whenever the haircut is partial, buyers will borrow up to the bor-






q∗, if ϕ3m2 + ϕ3ψ2a2(1   h)  q∗
ϕ3m2 + ϕ3ψ2a2(1   h), if ϕ3m2 + ϕ3ψ2a2(1   h) < q∗
where q∗ satisﬁes u′(q) = 1. Denote the solution by q(m2,a2).
The value function at the beginning of the second subperiod is simply a
weighted sum of the value functions in the AM and the DM:
V
j(m2,a2) = (1   α)V
DM,j(m2,a2) + αV
AM(m2,a2)
= ϕ3m2 + ϕ3E(ψ3)a2 + W(0) + σ
j[u(q(m2,a2))   q(m2,a2)]
+σ
j[ϕ3l2S(h)], for j = H,L,
Again, we have shown that l2 = ψ2a2(1 h) if h < ε or if ϕ3m2+ϕ3ψ2a2(1 h) <
16q∗. So the envelope conditions are,
V
j
m(m2,a2) = ϕ3 + σ
j[u




a (m2,a2) = ϕ3E(ψ3) +
σ
j[u
′(q(m2,a2))   1]ϕ3ψ2(1   h)1fϕ3m2 + ϕ3ψ2a2(1   h) < q
∗g
+σ
jϕ3ψ2(1   h)S(h)1fϕ3m2 + ϕ3ψ2a2(1   h) < q
∗ or h < εg,
where 1fxg is an indicator such that it is one if x is true, and is zero other-
wise. We will focus on equilibria in which the liquidity constraints are binding.
Therefore, we have the following result:
Lemma 5. Suppose the liquidity constraints are binding in the DM, then
V
j





a (m2,a2) = ϕ3E(ψ3) + σ
j[∆
j + S(h)]ϕ3ψ2(1   h),
where ∆j = u′(q(m2,a2))   1.
Subperiod 1: Asset market
At the beginning of a period, each agent receives a signal s 2 fH,Lg. A signal
H denotes the case in which the agent will likely become a buyer in the DM
(high liquidity need). A signal L denotes the case in which the agent will likely
become a seller in the DM (low liquidity need). The signal will turn out to be
incorrect with a probability θ < 1
2. Therefore, an agent with a high signal will
be a buyer with a probability σH = (1   α)(1   θ), and an agent with a low
signal will be a buyer with a probability σL = (1   α)θ. And an agent will
attend the asset market with a probability α. After receiving the signal s, an











































2), (= if a
j
2 > 0)
And the envelope conditions of the second subperiod are
V
j





a (m2,a2) = ϕ3E(ψ3) + σ
j[∆
j + S(h)]ϕ3E(ψ3)(1   h)
So, depending on whether the non-negativity constraints are binding or not,
agents’ portfolio choice can lead to three diﬀerent outcomes: only money, only
asset, or both. By comparing the marginal rate of substitution (i.e. V j
a /V j
m)
and the relative price (i.e. ψ1), we get the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For a type j = H,L agent,










































































We will now proceed to characterize the steady state equilibrium.
3.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section, we will characterize the steady state equilibrium given the policy
set by the government (i.e. the money supply M and the money growth rate
across periods γ)15 and the stock of asset A. Below, the analysis will focus on
the case in which liquidity constraints are binding for both types. Moreover,
we are interested in symmetric steady state equilibria in which nominal prices





ψ = γ, and q = q+1.





qH, qL, ϕ3, ψ1, ψ3, λH, λL) satisfying the following set of conditions. Let’s ﬁrst
deﬁne some notation. Below, we will use superscript “a” to denote the type
who holds only assets, and use “m” to denote the type who holds only money.
In case one type holds both assets, w.l.o.g., we will use “m” to denote H and
“a” to denote L.16
15Note that  is the rate of growth of money stock from one period to the next, which is
a result of both lump-sum transfers and loan default.
16Both conditions (3.10) and (3.11) have to be satisﬁed for a type holding both money and
asset.
19Equilibrium conditions are as follows:
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2 = M + ψ1A (3.8)









Here, (3.1) is the condition for the optimal money demand in the CM. (3.2)
and (3.3) are the binding liquidity constraints in the DM. (3.4) and (3.5) are
the market clearing conditions in the ﬁrst subperiod AM. (3.6),(3.7), (3.10)
and (3.11) are conditions for the optimal portfolio choice in the ﬁrst subperiod.
(3.8) is the budget constraint in the ﬁrst subperiod. (3.9) is the market price
of an asset that delivers δ.
Deﬁning i as the (net) nominal interest rate, then the Fisher’s equation and
(3.1) imply















20(3.6) and (3.7) then imply





f1 + σm[u′(qm)   1]g
+
E(ψ3;+1)
ψ1;+1 f1 + σa[u′(qa)   1 + S(h)](1   h)g

 (3.12)







Combining (3.2)-(3.5), (3.9) and (3.12) gives one equation in terms of (ϕ3,ma
2,aa
2):
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2 ) . We can now deﬁne the steady state equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 7. A steady state monetary equilibrium consists of a price of money
ϕ3 > 0 and a portfolio (ma
2,aa
2) such that equation (3.14) and conditions (3.10)-
(3.11) are satised.
3.2 Policy Constraint
In the previous section, we characterize the set of equilibrium given any ar-
bitrary policy i (which is pinned down by the money growth rate γ) and h.
However, not all (i,h) policy pairs are feasible for the central bank to pick. In
particular, the choice of h will imply a minimum size of money injection, and
thus a minimum level of interest rate i.
Note that whenever a borrower defaults his/her loan l2, the new money
temporarily lent out by the central bank in subperiod 2 will only be partially
withdrawn by the central bank who sells the asset for ψ3(δ) = δ/ϕ3 in subperiod
3.
21Lemma 3 implies that, for each unit of asset posted as collateral, the ex-
pected nominal size of default is





Let ¯ A(h) be the amount of asset posted as collateral (as a function of the
haircut policy), the money growth is equal to








The ﬁrst term is the money injection due to unrepaid loans, and the second
term is the lump sum transfers from the central bank in the third subperiod.
We are going to restrict that the central bank does not possess any taxation
power (i.e. ∆M  0). Therefore, there is a lower bound on the nominal interest
rate, as summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Suppose the central bank does not have taxation power. The





4Mβϕ3ε(ε   h)2 + 1
β.
4 Simple Equilibrium
In this section, we will ﬁrst consider one simple equilibrium in which the H-type
brings only money and the L-type brings only asset to the second subperiod. We
will ﬁrst derive some analytical results regarding the existence of the equilibrium
and some comparative statics. Then we will use numerical examples to discuss
the optimal haircut policy within this class of equilibria. Finally, we will look at
two extensions: a non-exclusive lending facility, where both buyers and sellers
have access to the facility; and a one-time temporary change in the haircut.
224.1 Existence and Comparative Statics





2 = 0. For simplicity, assume that u(q) = log(q).
Substituting these values in equations (3.13) and (3.14) yields the following
result.
Proposition 9. Suppose u(q) = log(q). In a simple equilibrium,
(i) The equilibrium quantities are qH = 2Mϕ3, and qL = 2A¯ δ(1   h);
(ii) The equilibrium asset price in subperiod one is ψ1 = M
A .




2M(1 + 2i + σH)
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(1   α) + 2¯ δA
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The welfare maximizing policy of the planner is a (h,i) pair which maximizes
W(i,h) subject to the policy constraint (4.2).
We will ﬁrst derive some comparative statics results when a simple equi-
librium exists, and then provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence. The
following proposition summarizes several comparative statics results.
Proposition 10. Suppose u(q) = log(q). In a simple equilibrium,
(i) dϕ3
di < 0, dqH
di < 0, dqL
di = 0;
(ii) dϕ3
dh > 0, dqH
dh > 0, dqL
dh < 0;
23(iii) dϕ3
dA δ > 0, dqH
dA δ > 0, dqL
dA δ > 0;
(iv) dϕ3
dε > 0, dqH
dε > 0, dqL
dε = 0;
1. Eﬀect of an increase in i
Other things being equal, an increase in the interest rate i lowers the equi-
librium value of money (ϕ3) (by (4.2)), and lowers the equilibrium consumption
of the H-type (qH), and reduces the average welfare.
2. Eﬀect of an decrease in h
A cut in the haircut h relaxes the borrowing constraint of the L-type and
thus increases the equilibrium consumption of the L-type (qL). Given that
¯ δ < 1, a cut in haircut will lead to a lower ϕ3 and thus lower consumption of
the H-type.17
If (4.2) is initially binding, a cut in h will also tighten the policy constraint
(by (4.2)), raising the lower-bound of the interest rate. Increasing i will further
reduce the consumption of the H-type.
Here, we can see that lowering the haircut has diﬀerent eﬀects on agents
with diﬀerent portfolio choices. On the one hand, it can relax the liquidity
constraint of illiquid asset holders. On the other hand, it will lower the value
of liquid assets (e.g. money) by both reducing the returns to holding liquidity
and increasing the cost of holding liquidity (by increasing i). As a result, it will
tighten the liquidity constraint of liquid asset holders.
3. Eﬀect of a drop in ¯ δ or A
A drop in ¯ δ or A will lower the consumption of the L-type, and it will also
decrease the value of ϕ3 and thus lower the consumption of the H-type. If (4.2)
is initially binding, it will relax the policy constraint and allow for a higher h
or a lower i.
17Proposition 11 argues that a simple equilibrium exists for  ! 0; ! 0; and h ! ".
Note that continuity is maintained as parameters converge to the this point. In particular,
qL is the consumption of a low type conditional on being a buyer in the second subperiod.
As  ! 0 and  ! 0, the probability of a low type being a buyer converges to zero, but
his consumption, qL, conditional on being a buyer (which is zero probability event) is still
strictly positive.
244. Eﬀect of increase in ε
An increase in ε will not aﬀect the consumption of the L-type, but it will
increase the value of ϕ3 and thus increases the consumption of the H-type.
If (4.2) is initially binding, it will tighten the policy constraint and require a
higher h or a higher i to satisfy the policy constraint.
Now, we can show that the simple equilibrium exists under some conditions.
Proposition 11. Suppose u(q) = log(q), and 1 4A¯ δ(i(1 ε) ε) < 2¯ δA < 1.
There exists a simple equilibrium for α ! 0,θ ! 0, and h ! ε.
To show this, substitute the parameter values in lemma 6 to show that
agents specialize in their portfolio choice. Then, proposition 9 is used to show
that the liquidity constraint is binding, as asserted (see Appendix B). The idea
is that, when the signal is almost perfect (θ ! 0), the L-type has no incentive
to hold money for consumption. When the haircut is high (h ! ε), the H-type
does not have incentive to hold asset for consumption. Furthermore, the interest
rate i has to be high to make the liquidity constraints binding. Moreover, the
real value of asset dividend (δA) cannot be too high or too low. If it is too low,
the L-type does not want to hold only assets. If it is too high, the H-type does
not want to hold only money.18
4.2 Numerical Examples
In this section, we will use a numerical example to illustrate the model implica-
tions derived above. In particular, we will set the parameter values as follows:
M = 1, A = 7.5, β = 0.94, ¯ δ = 0.06, ε = 0.4, α = 0.1, θ = 0.02.
18Since the equations characterizing the equilibrium are continuous, and the conditions
for specialized portfolios are satisﬁed with strict inequalities at this speciﬁc point, a simple
equilibrium exists in the neighborhood of this subset of the parameter space.
25Existence of Equilibrium
The previous analysis shows that a simple equilibrium exists when equations
(3.10), (3.11), (4.2) and condition (4.2) are all satisﬁed. Figure 4 shows the
existence of equilibrium over the (h,i) plain. In particular, equations (3.10),
(3.11), (4.2) are satisﬁed inside the area bounded by the solid line. Condition
(4.2) is satisﬁed for any (h,i) pairs lying above the dotted curve. As shown
above, the policy constraint is downward sloping. Therefore, inside the grey
area, a simple equilibrium exists.
Optimal Choice of Policy
We now study the optimal policy within the set of simple equilibria. The opti-
mal choice of (h,i) depends on the objective function of the policy maker. The
consumption of H-type is increasing in h and decreasing in i. The consump-
tion of L-type is decreasing in h and is independent of i. In our example, the
total output and the welfare are both decreasing in h and i. Within the set
of simple equilibria, in order to maximize the consumption of the H-type, the
policy maker should choose h = ε = 0.4000 and i = 0.0638. Alternatively, a
policy maker who wants to maximize the consumption of the L-type, the total
output or the welfare should set h = 0.1480 and i = 0.0646.
4.3 Extensions
Non-exclusive Lending Facility
In the previous sections, it is assumed that only buyers have access to the central
bank lending facility in the second sub-period. However, a seller might also
have incentive to borrow from the central bank even though he does not want
to consume. The idea is again that a loan collateralized on a risky asset with
partial haircut provides an insurance for the borrower against the downside risk
































































Figure 7: Consumption of L-type
Total Output in DM
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28the price of the asset drops below the face value of the loan before repayment,
then the seller has an option to default and shift the capital loss to the central
bank. This option value depends on the haircut and is captured by the function
S(h). When the haircut is low, S(h) is high and sellers have higher incentives
to borrow from the central bank, even though they do not need to consume in
the second-subperiod. In this section, we consider the case when the lending
facility is available to both buyers and sellers. If the central bank is unable to
exclude sellers from borrowing from the lending facility, then the equilibrium
value of money is modiﬁed to
ϕ3 =
1
2M(1 + 2i + σH)
[
1   α + 2¯ δA(1   (1   h)σ
L) + ¯ δ
2A(1   α)(ε   h)
2]
.




E(ψ3)[1 + (1   α)S(h)(1   h)]   ψ1
ψ1   E(ψ3)(1   h)
.
The policy constraint becomes
i 







Comparing this policy constraint with constraint (4.2) suggests that the
policy constraint is tightened when the central bank cannot restrict lending to
the buyers only: the i lower bound is higher for any given h, and the marginal
eﬀect of h on the i lower bound is higher. Therefore, in Figure 10, the feasible
set of policy becomes smaller.
The welfare maximizing policy is given by i = 0.0671 and h = 0.3264. When
the central bank cannot restrict lending, providing consumption insurance to
the L-type by lowering the haircut h becomes more costly in terms of distorting
the H-type’s consumption.














Figure 11: Non-exclusive Lending: Welfare
A policy implication is that the optimal haircut should depend on the fea-
tures of the lending facility. When the central bank is about to lend exclu-
sively to agents who are really in need of liquidity, then the haircut can be set
more generously, relative to a situation where the central bank cannot exclude
borrowers who are not constrained but borrow only to take advantage of the
insurance against the downside risk of the collateral asset.
30Temporary versus Permanent Change in Haircut
In the previous section, we consider optimal permanent changes in haircut.
Here, we study how a one-time change in haircut can improve on the allocation
temporarily.
Here, we consider the case in which the central bank can exclude borrowing
from the sellers. Suppose the central bank is following the optimal policy (i.e.
h = 0.1480, i = 0.0646) and is allowed to make one-time change in h in the
current period (with the agents believing the central bank will bring the (i,h)
back to the original levels before the change).
Since this is a one-time change in h, it will have no eﬀect on future allocation.
In particular, it will not aﬀect the policy constraint (4.2). The only eﬀect is
on the current stock of money supply and on the current price of money in the
third subperiod. Denoting ˜ h as the haircut in the current period, the current
period equilibrium fϕ3(˜ h),∆M(˜ h),qH(˜ h),qL(˜ h)g is then determined by
ϕ3(˜ h) =
(1   α) + 2¯ δA
(








(ε   ˜ h)
2
q
H(˜ h) = 2Mϕ3(˜ h)
q
L(˜ h) = 2A¯ δ(1   ˜ h).
As shown in Figure (12), it is welfare maximizing to temporarily lower the
haircut from h = 0.1480 to h =  0.0.0452. Note that the optimal one-period
deviation of the haircut is indeed negative to improve ex-post eﬃciency. This
will temporarily increase the money stock (additionally by 0.16%), lower the
price of money (by 0.15%), increase the consumption of the L-type (by 22.68%)
and lower the consumption of the H-type (by 0.15%).
In the table, we also report the case of a one-time change in the haircut in

























Figure 12: One-time Change in Haircut: Welfare and Change in Money Stock
the case of non-exclusive lending facilities. As expected, in this case, it is not
optimal to lower the haircut by too much.
Table 1: Optimal Permanent and Temporary Haircut
h i W ˜ h ˜ W
Exclusive Lending 0.1480 0.0646 -0.4533 -0.0452 -0.4531
Non-Exclusive Lending 0.3264 0.0671 -0.4540 0.3128 -0.4540
A policy implication is that a one-time, unanticipated reduction in the hair-
cut is less distortionary than a permanent change. This may provide the central
bank with a tool to improve allocation in response to temporary shocks (e.g.
temporary aggregate shocks to liquidity). Of course, this raises issues related
to the commitment of the central bank.
5 Portfolio Distortion and Optimal Policy
The previous sections focused on the analysis of a simple equilibrium in which
agents specialize in their portfolio choice. This section will examine how central
bank policy can aﬀect agents’ portfolio choice and the welfare.
Figure 13 plots the equilibrium outcomes for diﬀerent policy combinations
of h and i. The two upward sloping lines partition the h   i space into three
32h
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Figure 13: Policy and Portfolio Distortion
subsets, each of which denotes a diﬀerent equilibrium portfolio choice. The
downward sloping curve indicates the policy constraint faced by the central
bank. The points a to f denote diﬀerent portfolio choice examples which we
will discuss below.19 Table 2 reports the eﬀects of policy on the default option
value, portfolio, consumption, and welfare at these diﬀerent points in the h i
space.
First, we examine the eﬀect of lowering the haircut policy, holding the
interest rate ﬁxed.
When the haircut h is high (the right portion of the graph), the H-type will
bring only money to the second subperiod, and the L-type will bring only asset
to the second subperiod. This corresponds to the simple equilibrium discussed
19Note that points a and f are not implementable if the central bank cannot withdraw
money from the economy because they violate the policy constraint. Indeed, the whole area
under the downward sloping policy constraint is not implementable.
33Table 2: Eﬀects of Policy
h i S(h) mH aH mL aL qH qL W
a 2% 6.80% 0.0921 0 14.7800 2 0.2154 0.8693 0.8868 -0.4542
b 10% 6.80% 0.0625 2 0.2213 0 14.7787 0.8776 0.7980 -0.4538
c 30% 6.80% 0.0089 2 0 0 15 0.8863 0.6300 -0.4539
d 14.8% 6.46% 0.0466 2 0 0 15 0.8881 0.7668 -0.4533
e 30% 6.46% 0.0089 2 0 0 15 0.8890 0.6300 -0.4538
f 14.8% 6.40% 0.0466 2 0 0 15 0.8887 0.7668 -0.4532
in the previous section. An example is point c in the ﬁgure.
For lower haircut (the middle portion of the graph), the H-type is induced to
hold both money and asset because of the higher value of the “default option”.
For example, relative to point c, the haircut at point b is lower while the interest
rate is the same. As shown in the table, when h goes down, S(h) rises, and
the H-type is induced to hold more asset. As a result, the consumption of the
H-type goes down, and that of the L-type goes up, leading to a higher welfare
level.
For even lower haircut (the left portion of the graph), the “default option”
is so attractive that the H-type chooses to hold only asset, and the L-type will
hold both money and asset. Since the H-type is more likely to acquire the
collateralized loan, the asset has higher value to them than to the L-type (as
illustrated by the envelope condition in Lemma 5). For example, relative to
point b, the haircut at point a is lower while the interest rate is the same. As
shown in the table, when h goes down, S(h) rises further, and the H-type is
induced to hold only asset. As a result, the consumption of the H-type goes
down, and that of the L-type goes up. Since the H-type is more likely to
consume, this further distortion of their portfolio reduces the welfare level.
Now, we examine the eﬀect of lowering the interest rate, holding the haircut
policy ﬁxed. Relative to point c, the interest rate is lower at point e while the
haircut is the same. This will lower the opportunity cost of holding money and
34increase the equilibrium purchasing power of money, allowing the H-type to
consume more. As a result, the welfare level goes up.
The optimal policy combination will take into account the eﬀects above as
well as the policy constraint. Point d indicates the welfare-maximizing policy
which is given by h = 0.148 and i = 0.0646. Finally, at point f the interest
rate is further reduced and the welfare is even higher. However this policy
combination is not feasible because it violates the policy constraint: the haircut
is too low for supporting that interest rate in equilibrium.
The previous discussion highlights the trade-oﬀ faced by the central bank
when setting the optimal policy combination of haircuts and interest rate. On
the one hand, lowering the haircut can provide more liquidity insurance to
constrained agents. On the other, it will also provide more insurance against
the downside risk of the illiquid asset, as captured by S(h). The ﬁrst insurance
is welfare improving, but the latter insurance can distort agents’ portfolio choice
and can tighten the central bank’s policy constraint. The haircut and the
interest rate have to be set optimally to balance these two eﬀects.
6 Discussion
In the model, we have assumed a constant supply of illiquid assets and studied
the eﬀect of haircut policy on the price of these assets. In this section, we endo-
genize the amount of the pledgable asset and discuss the equilibrium response
to changes in haircut policy. To obtain an analytical solution, we will ﬁrst focus
on the simple equilibria in which agents specialize in their portfolio choice. We
will then consider the general case by studying a numerical example.
Suppose there is no endowment of illiquid assets. Instead, in the (sub-period
3) centralized market of period t, agents have to choose how much illiquid asset,
A+1, to be produced for the next period. As before, each of these assets will
yield random real dividend δ at the end of the period t + 1 CM. The cost of
35producing A units of illiquid asset is give by C(A) = (¯ δ + τ)A, with τ > 0.
Note that the asset is non-productive because the per-unit cost is higher than





 H3 = y3   ϕ3m+1   C(A+1) + ϕ3∆M.
Here, ∆M = M+1   M3 with M3 and M+1 being the total money stock at the




y3   ϕ3m+1   C(A+1) + ϕ3∆M + βZ+1(m+1,A+1)
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Z+1(m+1,A+1),= if A+1 > 0
Consider an equilibrium with A+1 > 0 and m+1 > 0. All other decision are
































The following equations then characterize a simple equilibrium:
(i) The equilibrium quantities are qH = 2Mϕ3, and qL = 2A¯ δ(1   h);
(ii) The equilibrium asset price in subperiod one is ψ1 = M
A .




2M(1 + 2i + σH)
[
(1   α) + 2¯ δA
(
1   σ










Consider ϕ3 as functions of A in the previous two equations. It is straight-
forward to show that the diﬀerence between the two functions is monotonically
decreasing in A and there is a unique solution (ϕ3,A) solving the two equations.
Also, focusing on simple equilibrium with interior solution, it is easy to show
that dϕ3
dh > 0, dA
dh > 0. The idea is that, increasing haircuts tighten the liquidity
constraint of buyers in the second sub-period. This will increase the price of
money. Since money and asset are substitutes, agents are induced to produce
more illiquid assets.
We now use an numerical example to illustrate the general eﬀects of chang-
ing the haircut. In this numerical example, we set τ = 0.001. As reported in
the following table, an increase in h again tightens agents’ liquidity constraint
and induces higher investment in the non-productive illiquid asset.
A full characterization of the equilibria and optimal haircut policy in this
environment has proven technically very challenging and is left for future re-
search.
37h i A aH aL W
0.1 1% 7.0198 14.0153 0.0243 -0.4646
0.2 1% 7.0657 14.1314 0 -0.4645
0.3 1% 7.0776 14.1552 0 -0.4649
0.4 1% 7.0895 14.1790 0 -0.4654
0.5 1% 7.1017 14.2034 0 -0.4661
7 Conclusion
We have developed a model of central bank lending to study the optimal choice
of haircut policy. We found that, in the presence of liquidity shocks, credit
market imperfections and asset price uncertainty, there is a trade-oﬀ between
relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents, and increasing potential inﬂation
risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents. The lending facility provides
a bundle of two types of insurance: an insurance against liquidity risk and an
insurance against the downside risk of the illiquid asset.
Furthermore, we show that the optimal haircut is higher when the central
bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Also,
for a temporary surprise drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more
aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut. Finally, we
endogenize the amount of pledgable asset and illustrate how an increase in
haircut can tighten agents’ liquidity constraints and induce a higher investment
in non-productive pledgable assets.
We have studied stationary environments and abstracted from aggregate
uncertainty. An interesting question left for future research is to analyze the
optimal haircut policy in the presence of cyclical ﬂuctuations.
38Appendix A: Value of Default Option
A borrower with a loan l2 can choose to repay the loan and get back the
collateral (with a price ψ3) or to default and lose the asset. Therefore, the







¯ δ(1   h)
E maxf¯ δ(1   h)   δ,0g
=
ϕ3l2
2ε¯ δ2(1   h)
∫  δ(1−h)
 δ(1−ε)






The ﬁrst equality is a result of Lemma 1 and 2. The second equality comes
from the distributional assumption.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 11
To prove: Suppose u(q) = log(q), and 1   4A¯ δ(i(1   ε)   ε) < 2¯ δA < 1. There
exists a simple equilibrium for α ! 0,θ ! 0, and h ! ε.
Proof: Note that σH ! 1, σL ! 0 and S(h) ! 0. Also, in a simple equilibrium,
qH = 2Mϕ3 and qL = 2A¯ δ(1 h). The equilibrium price of money is then given
by
ϕ3 !
1 + 2¯ δA
4M(1 + i)
.
The consumption quantities are
q
H !
1 + 2¯ δA
2(1 + i)
q
L ! 2A¯ δ(1   h).




E(ψ3) = ψ2 !
4(1 + i)M¯ δ
1 + 2¯ δA
.
First, we need to check the incentive of the low type to hold only asset:
E(ψ3)[1 + σ
LS(h)(1   h)]   ψ1   σ
L∆
L(ψ1   E(ψ3)(1   h))
!
[
2¯ δA   (1   4i¯ δA)
] M
A(1 + 2¯ δA)
> 0,
which is satisﬁed if 2¯ δA > 1 4i¯ δA. Similarly, one can show that, if 1 4A¯ δ(i(1 
ε)   ε) < 2A¯ δ, then high types want to hold only money. Finally, one has to
check that qH,qL are constrained, and these conditions are satisﬁed if 2A¯ δ < 1.
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